Identification of dynamic games with unobserved heterogeneity and multiple equilibria
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Publication:2074594
DOI10.1016/j.jeconom.2020.11.016OpenAlexW3167504462MaRDI QIDQ2074594
Publication date: 10 February 2022
Published in: Journal of Econometrics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconom.2020.11.016
Statistics (62-XX) Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)
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