A new allocation rule for the housing market problem with ties

DOI10.1007/s10878-021-00727-zzbMath1485.91110OpenAlexW3158330340MaRDI QIDQ2075459

Xinsheng Xiong, Kun He, Xian-Jia Wang

Publication date: 14 February 2022

Published in: Journal of Combinatorial Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-021-00727-z

zbMATH Keywords

resource allocationPareto efficiencystrategy-proofnessalgorithmic game theorytop trading cycles algorithm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Algorithmic game theory and complexity (91A68)

Cites Work

• Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods
• The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects
• Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems
• Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: the top trading absorbing sets mechanisms
• Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
• Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
• Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
• Queue allocation of indivisible goods
• On cores and indivisibility
• Matching and chatting: an experimental study of the impact of network communication on school-matching mechanisms
• Depth-First Search and Linear Graph Algorithms

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