Bargaining with costly competition for the right to propose

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102558zbMath1483.91093OpenAlexW3196521262MaRDI QIDQ2075630

Quan Wen, Duozhe Li, Harold Houba

Publication date: 15 February 2022

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102558

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingcontestextreme equilibriaright to propose

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

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• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model
• Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value

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