Matching with ownership
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Publication:2075636
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102563zbMath1481.91122OpenAlexW3202599236MaRDI QIDQ2075636
Publication date: 15 February 2022
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102563
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Cites Work
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