Strict pure strategy Nash equilibrium in large finite-player games when the action set is a manifold

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102580zbMath1481.91008OpenAlexW3210033667MaRDI QIDQ2075646

Guilherme Carmona, Konrad Podczeck

Publication date: 15 February 2022

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102580

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumgeneric propertylarge gamespure strategydifferentiable manifold

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Related Items (1)

Special issue in honor of Nicholas C. Yannelis. II

Cites Work

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• Approximate equilibrium in pure strategies for non-atomic games
• Introduction to Smooth Manifolds
• Monopolistic Competition in a Large Economy with Differentiated Commodities
• Differential Topology
• Strict pure strategy Nash equilibria in large finite‐player games
• External Economies of Scale and Competitive Equilibrium

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