College admissions with ties and common quotas: integer programming approach
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Publication:2077946
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2021.08.033zbMath1490.91139OpenAlexW3196438934MaRDI QIDQ2077946
Zsuzsanna Jankó, Péter Biró, Kolos Csaba Ágoston, Endre Kováts
Publication date: 23 February 2022
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2021.08.033
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