Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models
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Publication:2078029
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2021.10.008zbMath1483.91055OpenAlexW3214430762MaRDI QIDQ2078029
Bernardo Moreno, Dolors Berga, Salvador Barberá
Publication date: 25 February 2022
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.barcelonagse.eu/sites/default/files/working_paper_pdfs/1024_0.pdf
Pareto efficiencystrategy-proofnessmechanismspreference functionsallocation problemsex post incentive compatibilityjury decisionsinterdependent types
Related Items (4)
Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel ⋮ The limits of ex post implementation without transfers ⋮ Domains Admitting Ex Post IncentiveCompatible and Respectful Mechanisms: A Characterization for the Two-Alternative Case ⋮ Green closed-loop supply chain optimization strategy considering CER and incentive-compatibility theory under uncertainty
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