The trembling chairman paradox
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Publication:2078032
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2021.11.002zbMath1489.91093OpenAlexW3214980293MaRDI QIDQ2078032
Publication date: 25 February 2022
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.11.002
Cites Work
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- Stable Equilibria—A Reformulation
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
- On the generic finiteness of equilibrium outcomes in plurality games
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