The trembling chairman paradox

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2021.11.002zbMath1489.91093OpenAlexW3214980293MaRDI QIDQ2078032

Carlos Alós-Ferrer

Publication date: 25 February 2022

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.11.002

zbMATH Keywords

proper equilibriatrembling-hand perfectioniterated dominancevoting gameschairman paradox

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• On stability of perfect equilibrium points
• Dominated strategies and common knowledge
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Order independence for iterated weak dominance
• When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?
• Corrigendum: Order independence for iterated weak dominance
• Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule
• Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability
• Are strictly perfect equilibria proper? A counterexample
• Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
• Stable Equilibria—A Reformulation. Part II. Discussion of the Definition, and Further Results
• Stable Equilibria—A Reformulation
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
• On the generic finiteness of equilibrium outcomes in plurality games

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