Information manipulation and competition

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2021.11.007zbMath1483.91161OpenAlexW4200063685MaRDI QIDQ2078046

Andreas Grunewald, Matthias Kräkel

Publication date: 25 February 2022

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.11.007

zbMATH Keywords

competitioninformation manipulationbackfiringsignal jamming

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) 2-person games (91A05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

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• Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change*
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