Efficient mixtures of priority rules for assigning objects
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Publication:2078057
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2021.11.009zbMath1483.91103OpenAlexW4200342449MaRDI QIDQ2078057
Publication date: 25 February 2022
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.11.009
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