Market screening with limited records

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2021.12.001zbMath1483.91096OpenAlexW4206166782MaRDI QIDQ2078060

Ayça Kaya, Santanu Roy

Publication date: 25 February 2022

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.12.001

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectiontransparencyrepeated saleslemons marketlimited records

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Signaling in dynamic markets with adverse selection

Cites Work

• Limited records and reputation bubbles
• Sustainable reputations with rating systems
• Information about sellers' past behavior in the market for lemons
• Information Acquisition and Reputation Dynamics
• Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons
• Sequences of Games with Varying Opponents
• Transparency and distressed sales under asymmetric information
• Trading Dynamics with Private Buyer Signals in the Market for Lemons
• Reputation Effects Under Interdependent Values
• Community Enforcement of Trust with Bounded Memory
• Motivational Ratings

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