Limited foresight equilibrium
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Publication:2078063
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.001zbMath1483.91020OpenAlexW4205933424MaRDI QIDQ2078063
Publication date: 25 February 2022
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.001
Games in extensive form (91A18) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)
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Cites Work
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