Efficiency in asymmetric auctions with endogenous reserve prices

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2021.12.007zbMath1483.91098OpenAlexW4206190221MaRDI QIDQ2078069

René Kirkegaard

Publication date: 25 February 2022

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.12.007

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyasymmetric auctionsreserve prices

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Subsidy and taxation in all-pay auctions under incomplete information

Cites Work

• Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case
• Risk aversion and optimal reserve prices in first- and second-price auctions
• Log-concave probability and its applications
• A Mechanism Design Approach to Ranking Asymmetric Auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• Asymmetric Auctions