Delegated expertise: implementability with peer-monitoring

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2021.12.008zbMath1483.91061OpenAlexW4206446842MaRDI QIDQ2078070

Yaron Azrieli

Publication date: 25 February 2022

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.12.008

zbMATH Keywords

information acquisitionimplementationmoral hazardmonitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Mechanism design with information acquisition
• Robust incentives for information acquisition
• Information acquisition in committees
• Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise
• Would rational voters acquire costly information?
• Monitoring experts
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
• Delegated information acquisition with moral hazard