Cheap talk with private signal structures

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.005zbMath1483.91047OpenAlexW4206220740MaRDI QIDQ2078074

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 25 February 2022

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.005

zbMATH Keywords

strategic communicationBayesian persuasioninformation design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Related Items (1)

Private disclosure with multiple agents

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• A 2-Person Game with Lack of Information on 1½ Sides
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• Optimal Delegation

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