Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities
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Publication:2078086
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.012zbMath1483.91136OpenAlexW4210790765MaRDI QIDQ2078086
Akina Yoshimura, Shoya Tsuruta, Yusuke Iwase
Publication date: 25 February 2022
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.012
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