Voting on tricky questions

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.008zbMath1483.91071OpenAlexW4206980361MaRDI QIDQ2078087

Tomoya Tajika

Publication date: 25 February 2022

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.008

zbMATH Keywords

information aggregationstrategic votinginefficiencyprecision uncertainty

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

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• Preference Monotonicity and Information Aggregation in Elections
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
• Condorcet meets Ellsberg
• Aggregating Information by Voting: The Wisdom of the Experts versus the Wisdom of the Masses
• Public Protests and Policy Making*

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