Delegation and ambiguity in correlated equilibrium
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Publication:2078094
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.023zbMath1485.91012OpenAlexW4210789749MaRDI QIDQ2078094
Publication date: 25 February 2022
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.023
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