Dynamic contracting for innovation under ambiguity
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Publication:2078097
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2022.01.015zbMath1485.91122OpenAlexW4210316161MaRDI QIDQ2078097
Publication date: 25 February 2022
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://dp.ashoka.edu.in/ash/wpaper/paper15.pdf
Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)
Cites Work
- Robustness of simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement
- Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard
- Recursive smooth ambiguity preferences
- Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
- Recursive multiple-priors.
- Dynamic variational preferences
- Dynamic choice under ambiguity
- A More Robust Definition of Subjective Probability
- Optimal Contracts for Experimentation
- Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits
- Learning Under Ambiguity
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