Robust coalitional implementation
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Publication:2078099
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.022zbMath1485.91086OpenAlexW4210360558MaRDI QIDQ2078099
Huiyi Guo, Nicholas C. Yannelis
Publication date: 25 February 2022
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.022
Related Items
Incentive compatibility under ambiguity ⋮ Behavioral strong implementation ⋮ An alternative equivalent formulation for robust implementation
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