Credible spatial preemption in a mixed oligopoly

DOI10.1007/S00712-022-00790-YzbMath1498.91250OpenAlexW4281294956MaRDI QIDQ2081097

Jeong-Yoo Kim, Sawoong Kang

Publication date: 12 October 2022

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-022-00790-y

zbMATH Keywords

social welfaremixed duopolyentry deterrence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Welfare economics (91B15)

Cites Work

• Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly
• Mixed duopoly, merger and multiproduct firms
• Cournot-Bertrand comparison in a mixed oligopoly
• A note on credible spatial preemption in an entry-exit game
• Cournot Competition Yields Spatial Agglomeration
• On Hotelling's "Stability in Competition"

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