A theory of unanimous jury voting with an ambiguous likelihood

DOI10.1007/s11238-021-09857-6zbMath1497.91106OpenAlexW4206256833MaRDI QIDQ2081896

Simona Fabrizi, Steffen Lippert, Addison Pan, Matthew J. Ryan

Publication date: 30 September 2022

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-021-09857-6

zbMATH Keywords

votingambiguitypivotalitybelief updating

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

A note on pivotality

Cites Work

• The fragility of information aggregation in large elections
• Feddersen and Pesendorfer meet Ellsberg
• Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
• A rule for updating ambiguous beliefs
• Non-congruent views about signal precision in collective decisions
• A note on pivotality
• Private and common value auctions with ambiguity over correlation
• Are individuals more risk and ambiguity averse in a group environment or alone? Results from an experimental study
• Deliberative voting
• Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms
• Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals
• Condorcet meets Ellsberg

This page was built for publication: A theory of unanimous jury voting with an ambiguous likelihood