Matching with contracts: calculation of the complete set of stable allocations

DOI10.1007/s11238-021-09859-4zbMath1500.91095OpenAlexW4206612286MaRDI QIDQ2081899

Eliana Pepa Risma

Publication date: 30 September 2022

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-021-09859-4

zbMATH Keywords

matchingcontractsstable allocationsfull set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Related Items (1)

The lattice of envy-free many-to-many matchings with contracts

Cites Work

• Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
• A deferred acceptance algorithm with contracts
• Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts
• Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
• An algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings.
• A lattice-theoretical fixpoint theorem and its applications
• Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
• Conflict and Coincidence of Interest in Job Matching: Some New Results and Open Questions
• The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
• On the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings for a many-to-one model^∗

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