Should I stay or should I go? Congestion pricing and equilibrium selection in a transportation network

DOI10.1007/s11238-021-09852-xzbMath1500.91045OpenAlexW4206348040MaRDI QIDQ2081905

E. Elisabet Rutström, Enrica Carbone, Vinayak V. Dixit

Publication date: 30 September 2022

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-021-09852-x

zbMATH Keywords

government pricing and policysupply and congestiontransportation: demand

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games involving graphs (91A43) Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Experimental studies (91A90)

Uses Software

• Z-Tree
• VISSIM

Cites Work

• Adjustment patterns and equilibrium selection in experimental signaling games
• Commuters route choice behaviour
• Learning and transfer in signaling games
• Comparative statics of a signaling game: An experimental study
• Leading-by-example and signaling in voluntary contribution games: an experimental study
• "Coherent Arbitrariness": Stable Demand Curves Without Stable Preferences

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