Computing equilibrium in network utility-sharing and discrete election games

DOI10.1007/s10878-020-00554-8zbMath1503.91037OpenAlexW3023583468MaRDI QIDQ2082218

Rahul Swamy, Timothy Murray

Publication date: 4 October 2022

Published in: Journal of Combinatorial Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-020-00554-8

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumHotelling-Downsnetwork utility-sharing game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43) Games on graphs (graph-theoretic aspects) (05C57) Potential and congestion games (91A14) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

Cites Work

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