Common belief in rationality in games with unawareness
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Publication:2082778
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.05.005zbMath1505.91103OpenAlexW4293729668MaRDI QIDQ2082778
Publication date: 4 October 2022
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.05.005
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