Shapley value for TU-games with multiple memberships and externalities
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2082785
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.06.005zbMath1500.91008OpenAlexW4283527926MaRDI QIDQ2082785
Publication date: 4 October 2022
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.06.005
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Stability and fairness in models with a multiple membership
- Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues
- Configuration values: Extensions of the coalitional Owen value
- Efficient bidding with externalities
- Allocation rules for coalitional network games
- Dynamic club formation with coordination
- The lattice of embedded subsets
- Club networks with multiple memberships and noncooperative stability
- On weighted Shapley values
- Conference structures and fair allocation rules
- Centered graphs and the structure of ego networks
- Values of games in partition function form
- Farsighted coalitional stability
- The stochastic Shapley value for coalitional games with externalities
- Relaxations of symmetry and the weighted Shapley values
- A coalition formation value for games in partition function form
- On the \(\gamma \)-core of asymmetric aggregative games
- Expectation formation rules and the core of partition function games
- A note on the core of TU-cooperative games with multiple membership externalities
- The assignment game. I: The core
- Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks
- Joint games and compatibility
- How Can Cooperative Game Theory Be Made More Relevant to Economics? : An Open Problem
- Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
- Marginal Contributions and Externalities in the Value
- A graph‐theoretic generalization of the clique concept
- Graphs and Cooperation in Games
- Negotiation across multiple issues
- The Core of Aggregative Cooperative Games with Externalities
- N‐person games in partition function form
- Games with externalities: games in coalition configuration function form
This page was built for publication: Shapley value for TU-games with multiple memberships and externalities
