A comparison study on responsiveness of three mechanisms to affirmative action in school choice
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Publication:2084017
DOI10.1016/j.orl.2022.07.002OpenAlexW4285097849MaRDI QIDQ2084017
Yanyue Huang, Yajing Chen, Yunfan Zhao, Zhen-Hua Jiao
Publication date: 17 October 2022
Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2022.07.002
school choiceBoston mechanismtop trading cycles mechanismaffirmative actionresponsivenessdeferred acceptance mechanism
Cites Work
- Responsive affirmative action in school choice
- School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
- School choice: impossibilities for affirmative action
- Affirmative action through minority reserves: an experimental study on school choice
- Affirmative actions: the Boston mechanism case
- On cores and indivisibility
- When is the deferred acceptance mechanism responsive to priority-based affirmative action?
- Affirmative action under common school priorities: the top trading cycles mechanism case
- Responsive affirmative action in school choice: a comparison study
- On the welfare effects of affirmative actions in school choice
- Effective affirmative action in school choice
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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