On equilibrium threshold strategies when choosing between observable and unobservable queues

DOI10.1016/J.ORL.2022.08.004OpenAlexW4294000861WikidataQ114180622 ScholiaQ114180622MaRDI QIDQ2084036

Nimrod Dvir, Moshe Haviv, Refael Hassin

Publication date: 17 October 2022

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2022.08.004

zbMATH Keywords

queueingNash equilibriumstrategic behavior

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research, mathematical programming (90-XX)

Related Items (1)

Proofs of conjectures on the competition between observable and unobservable servers

Cites Work

• To queue or not to queue: equilibrium behavior in queueing systems.
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• Strategic customer behavior in a queueing system with a loss subsystem
• Queues. A course in queueing theory
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• Computational schemes for two exponential servers where the first has a finite buffer
• Optimal Routing Among ⋅/M/1 Queues with Partial Information
• Rational Queueing
• Optimal Priority-Purchasing and Pricing Decisions in Nonmonopoly and Monopoly Queues
• On the Advantage of Being the First Server
• Equilibrium Threshold Strategies: The Case of Queues with Priorities
• The Regulation of Queue Size by Levying Tolls

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