Risk aversion and equilibrium selection in a vertical contracting setting: an experiment

DOI10.1007/S11238-022-09868-XzbMath1500.91086OpenAlexW4210937406MaRDI QIDQ2084930

Alexis Garapin, Olivier Bonroy, Nicolas Pasquier

Publication date: 13 October 2022

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-022-09868-x

zbMATH Keywords

experimentrisk aversionbeliefs elicitationsecret contract

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Belief elicitation in experiments: Is there a hedging problem?
• Vertical control, opportunism, and risk sharing
• My money or yours: house money payment effects
• Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information
• House money effects in public good experiments
• Beliefs and actions in the trust game: creating instrumental variables to estimate the causal effect
• An experimental examination of the house money effect in a multi-period setting
• Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large

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