Revealed desirability: a novel instrument for social welfare

DOI10.1007/s11238-021-09855-8zbMath1500.91065OpenAlexW4206927239MaRDI QIDQ2084934

Guy Barokas

Publication date: 13 October 2022

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-021-09855-8

zbMATH Keywords

desirabilityrevealed preferenceallocation rulesnonforced choice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Welfare economics (91B15)

Related Items (2)

Majority-approval social choice ⋮ A non-lexicographic rule in the preference-approval setting

Cites Work

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• On the existence of Pareto efficient and envy-free allocations
• A foundation for Pareto optimality
• Identifying changing taste from demand data via golden eggs

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