A cross-efficiency model using bargaining theory in a two-stage network DEA
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Publication:2085039
DOI10.1007/s40314-022-02027-6OpenAlexW4298616701MaRDI QIDQ2085039
Sahar Khoshfetrat, Fariba Najafzade, Shahram Saeidi
Publication date: 14 October 2022
Published in: Computational and Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40314-022-02027-6
Related Items
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