Generic stability of the weakly Pareto-Nash equilibrium with strategy transformational barriers
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Publication:2086450
DOI10.1155/2022/1689732zbMath1501.91037OpenAlexW4302424998MaRDI QIDQ2086450
Luping Liu, Wensheng Jia, Li Zhou
Publication date: 25 October 2022
Published in: Journal of Function Spaces (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2022/1689732
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