Well-designed incentive schemes: introduction to the special issue in honor of Semih Koray

DOI10.1007/s10058-022-00307-5OpenAlexW4289835841MaRDI QIDQ2088894

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Publication date: 6 October 2022

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-022-00307-5

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Conference proceedings and collections of articles (00Bxx)

Cites Work

• Self-selective social choice functions
• Implementation via rights structures
• Characterization of self-selective social choice functions on the tops-only domain
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• Self-Selective Social Choice Functions Verify Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorems
• Multiprincipals multiagents incentive design
• Unnamed Item

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