Strategy-proof club formation with indivisible club facilities

DOI10.1007/s10058-021-00251-wzbMath1500.91080OpenAlexW3158347703MaRDI QIDQ2088896

Anirban Kar, John A. Weymark, Bhaskar Dutta

Publication date: 6 October 2022

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00251-w

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessclub goods

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

• The stability of hedonic coalition structures
• Public goods, growth, and welfare
• The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences
• Strategy-proof group selection under single-peaked preferences over group size
• Manipulability in a group activity selection problem
• Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences

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