Equilibria on a circular market when consumers do not always buy from the closest firm

DOI10.1007/s10058-022-00290-xzbMath1497.91206OpenAlexW4212856829MaRDI QIDQ2088898

Dominic Keehan, Dodge Cahan, Arkadii M. Slinko, John C. McCabe-Dansted

Publication date: 6 October 2022

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-022-00290-x

zbMATH Keywords

competition of firmsnon-convergent Nash equilibriasalop circular city model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Spatial models in economics (91B72)

Cites Work

• Strategic party formation on a circle and Duverger's law
• Equilibria in multi-party competition under uncertainty
• Multi-agent equilibria with market share and ranking objectives
• Electoral competition under best-worst voting rules
• The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Reconsidered: Some New Developments in the Theory of Spatial Competition

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