Bridging bargaining theory with the regulation of a natural monopoly

DOI10.1007/s10058-021-00263-6zbMath1500.91076OpenAlexW3196700719MaRDI QIDQ2088899

Ismail Saglam

Publication date: 6 October 2022

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00263-6

zbMATH Keywords

Cournot oligopolycooperative bargainingmonopoly regulation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

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