Three public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle

DOI10.1007/s10058-022-00306-6zbMath1497.91117OpenAlexW3215778168WikidataQ114228607 ScholiaQ114228607MaRDI QIDQ2088903

Lars Ehlers

Publication date: 6 October 2022

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-022-00306-6

zbMATH Keywords

single-peaked preferenceslexicographicmultiple public goodsreplacement-domination

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Individual preferences (91B08)

Cites Work

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