Three public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle
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Publication:2088903
DOI10.1007/s10058-022-00306-6zbMath1497.91117OpenAlexW3215778168WikidataQ114228607 ScholiaQ114228607MaRDI QIDQ2088903
Publication date: 6 October 2022
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-022-00306-6
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