To sell public or private goods

DOI10.1007/S10058-022-00305-7zbMath1500.91070OpenAlexW4289745541MaRDI QIDQ2088904

Simon Loertscher, Leslie M. Marx

Publication date: 6 October 2022

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-022-00305-7

zbMATH Keywords

public goodsmechanism designrevenue maximizationbilateral tradenon-fungible token (NFT)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60) Public goods (91B18) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

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