When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?
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Publication:2088905
DOI10.1007/s10058-021-00260-9zbMath1500.91060OpenAlexW3198784324MaRDI QIDQ2088905
Hayrullah Dindar, Fatma Aslan, Lainé, Jean
Publication date: 6 October 2022
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00260-9
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