Anonymous and neutral social choice: a unified framework for existence results, maximal domains and tie-breaking

DOI10.1007/s10058-021-00269-0zbMath1500.91062OpenAlexW3211075876MaRDI QIDQ2088909

Ayça Ebru Giritligil, Onur Doğan

Publication date: 6 October 2022

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00269-0

zbMATH Keywords

monotonicitygroup theoryanonymousanonymous and neutral tie-breakingneutral and resolute social welfare/choice rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Anonymous and neutral majority rules
• Resolute refinements of social choice correspondences
• The finer structure of resolute, neutral, and anonymous social choice correspondences
• Concorcet's principle implies the no show paradox
• Implementing efficient, anonymous and neutral social choice functions
• Breaking ties in collective decision-making
• Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited
• Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules
• The Impartial, Anonymous, and Neutral Culture Model: A Probability Model for Sampling Public Preference Structures

This page was built for publication: Anonymous and neutral social choice: a unified framework for existence results, maximal domains and tie-breaking