Tight social welfare approximation of probabilistic serial
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Publication:2089061
DOI10.1016/J.TCS.2022.08.003OpenAlexW4292241458WikidataQ114129034 ScholiaQ114129034MaRDI QIDQ2089061
Publication date: 6 October 2022
Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2022.08.003
Cites Work
- Probabilistic assignment of objects: characterizing the serial rule
- Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
- Size versus truncation robustness in the assignment problem
- Size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem
- Size versus fairness in the assignment problem
- Social Welfare in One-Sided Matchings: Random Priority and Beyond
- Welfare maximization and truthfulness in mechanism design with ordinal preferences
- Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
- A Truthful Cardinal Mechanism for One-Sided Matching
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
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