A tractable multi-leader multi-follower peak-load-pricing model with strategic interaction
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Publication:2089784
DOI10.1007/s10107-021-01708-0zbMath1501.91035OpenAlexW4226360227MaRDI QIDQ2089784
Alexandra Schwartz, Daniel Nowak, Lars Schewe, Veronika Grimm, Gregor Zöttl, Martin Schmidt
Publication date: 24 October 2022
Published in: Mathematical Programming. Series A. Series B (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-021-01708-0
Nonconvex programming, global optimization (90C26) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Applications of game theory (91A80) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74)
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