An ascending implementation of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism for the licensed shared access

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-87473-5_9zbMath1497.91132OpenAlexW3025267906MaRDI QIDQ2090241

Aurélien Bechler, Loutfi Nuaymi, Isabel Amigo, Patrick Maillé, Ayman Chouayakh

Publication date: 24 October 2022

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-87473-5_9

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• A truthful auction mechanism for dynamic allocation of LSA spectrum blocks for 5G
• An analysis of approximations for maximizing submodular set functions—I
• Optimal Efficiency Guarantees for Network Design Mechanisms

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