Impact of private observation in the Bayesian persuasion game

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-87473-5_20zbMath1497.91052OpenAlexW3133572985MaRDI QIDQ2090257

Maël Le Treust, Rony Bou Rouphael

Publication date: 24 October 2022

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-87473-5_20

zbMATH Keywords

side informationstrategic communicationBayesian persuasion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• A Mathematical Theory of Communication
• Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors
• Persuasion with limited communication capacity
• Slepian-Wolf coding over broadcast channels
• The rate-distortion function for source coding with side information at the decoder
• Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver

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