The evolution of ambiguity in sender -- receiver signaling games

DOI10.3390/g13020020zbMath1501.91025OpenAlexW4214489828MaRDI QIDQ2091654

Roland Mühlenbernd, Sławomir Wacewicz, Przemysław Żywiczyński

Publication date: 2 November 2022

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g13020020

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary stabilityambiguityimitation dynamicsonline experimentscontextual cuessender-receiver signaling games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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