An experimental study of strategic voting and accuracy of verdicts with sequential and simultaneous voting

DOI10.3390/g13020026zbMath1498.91174OpenAlexW4221035145MaRDI QIDQ2091660

Beth A. Freeborn, Lisa R. Anderson, Charles A. Holt, Katri K. Sieberg

Publication date: 2 November 2022

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g13020026

zbMATH Keywords

experimentssequential votingCondorcet juryjury voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (1)

Optimal policymaking under yardstick vote: an experimental study

Cites Work

• Sequential voting with abstention
• Unnamed Item

This page was built for publication: An experimental study of strategic voting and accuracy of verdicts with sequential and simultaneous voting