Endogenous abatement technology agreements under environmental regulation

DOI10.3390/G13020032zbMath1501.91124OpenAlexW4223893530MaRDI QIDQ2091671

Emilson C. D. Silva, Naoto Aoyama

Publication date: 2 November 2022

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g13020032

zbMATH Keywords

innovationlicensingenvironmental regulationresearch joint ventures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Cites Work

• Environmental policy with upstream pollution abatement technology firms
• Environmental policy and competitiveness: The Porter hypothesis and the composition of capital
• Instrument choice for environmental protection when technological innovation is endogenous.
• Technical change, external economies, and the Porter hypothesis
• Permits, standards, and technology innovation
• Spillovers in the development of new pollution abatement technology: a new look at the Porter-hypothesis

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