Monte Carlo methods for the Shapley-Shubik power index

Cites Work

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Computing Banzhaf-Coleman and Shapley-Shubik power indices with incompatible players
The Shapley-Shubik power index for dichotomous multi-type games
Power indices of simple games and vector-weighted majority games by means of binary decision diagrams
A relation-algebraic approach to simple games
NP-completeness of some problems concerning voting games
Polynomial calculation of the Shapley value based on sampling
Voting power in the governance of the international monetary fund
Improving polynomial estimation of the Shapley value by stratified random sampling with optimum allocation
Faster algorithms for computing power indices in weighted voting games
Voting power in the European Union enlargement
Weak convergence and empirical processes. With applications to statistics
On the computational complexity of weighted voting games
The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting
A linear approximation method for the Shapley value
Computing Power Indices for Large Voting Games
On the Complexity of Cooperative Solution Concepts
Square Root Voting System, Optimal Threshold and $$ \uppi $$ π
Efficient Computation of Power Indices for Weighted Majority Games
Sharing Rewards in Cooperative Connectivity Games
Probability Inequalities for Sums of Bounded Random Variables
Multilinear Extensions of Games
Generating functions for computing power indices efficiently
NP-completeness for calculating power indices of weighted majority games

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