Level-\(k\) models and overspending in contests

DOI10.3390/g13030045zbMath1501.91008OpenAlexW4281953646MaRDI QIDQ2091696

Malin Arve, Marco Serena

Publication date: 2 November 2022

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g13030045

zbMATH Keywords

level-\(k\) reasoningTullock contestsoverspending

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Overbidding and overspreading in rent-seeking experiments: cost structure and prize allocation rules
• Endogenous entry in contests
• Quantal response equilibrium and overbidding in private-value auctions
• Level-\(k\) reasoning in contests
• Can groups solve the problem of over-bidding in contests?
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
• Two-stage contests with budget constraints: an experimental study
• Identifying Higher-Order Rationality
• A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
• Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?

This page was built for publication: Level-\(k\) models and overspending in contests